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Abstract 
 Under Principal-Agent-Supervisor paradigm, we examine in this paper how a tax 
collection agency changes optimal schemes in order to lessen the occurrence of 
corruption between the tax collector and the taxpayer. The Principal, who maximizes the 
expected net fiscal revenue, reacts by decreasing tax rates when the supervisor is likely to 
engage in corrupt transaction with taxpayer.The combat against collusion and corruption 
may explain the greater reliance on indirect taxes than on direct taxes both in developed 
and developing countries. 
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1. Introduction 
    
ax evasion occurs when agents believe that the public sector output is 
independant of their actions.This phenomena leads to excessively low 
public revenues and,in turn, to the underprovision of public goods. In 
the light of the new theories of endogenous growth, this clearly exerts a negative 
effect on the development process. The seminal paper on tax evasion is due to 
Allingham ans Sandmo (1972), who examine comparative statics of tax evasion 
with respect to change in the tax rate, the penalties for evasion ans the frequency 
of audit. The idea that a taxpayer may be tempted to report taxable income 
below its true value was later extended by Kolm (1973), Srinivasan (1973) ans 
Cowell (1985) among others
1
.A major limitation of these previous studies lies in 
the exogeneity of both tax rate ans frequency of audit. 
 
       Hence, numerous studies have focused on the strategic interactions between 
fiscal authorities and economic agents being taxed, using game theoretic 
arguments or Principal Agent models to characterize the optimal taxation 
mechanisms at te disposal of the authorities ( see Border and Sobel , 
1987,Greenberg, 1984, Reinganum and Wilde,1985).More recently, models of 
tax evasion including the possibility of corruption in tax administration have 
been examined in the context of three-tier hierarchy. Indeed, the theory of 
hierarchica collusion developed by Tirole (1986, 1992) has been used in an 
effort to better capture complex relationships between governments, fiscal 
authorities and taxpayers. For example, potential corruption of fiscal agencies by 
taxpayers leads to higher audit rate than when such a pressure is absent ( 
Chander and Wilde,1990). A certain degree of tolerance for collusion can be an 
integral part of efficient fiscal collection mechanisms given the resources 
                                               
1 For a comprehensive survey on tax evasion and implications for policy analysis ,see Slemrod ans Yitzhaki 
(2001).  
T 
constraint faced by the government (Flatters and Mcleod, 1995). Finally, 
considering wage incentives designed to thwart bureaucratic collusion, Besley 
ans MacLaren (1993) show that the efficiency wage may not be an appropriate 
choice. 
 
       Again, an important limitation remains in theses studies thaht have departed 
from the standard principal –agent setting by allowing taxpayer and tax 
collectors to collude.Indeed, according to this literature, it is always assumed 
that auditing is perfect. Once the audit is carried out , this assumption means that 
there is perfect certainty regarding the income of audited taxpayers.However, as 
shown in Cowell (1990), the structure of taxation  largely depends on the level 
of information obtained regarding unobservable variables. To the best of our 
knowledge, Hindricks et al.(1999) is the first reference dealing with collection 
and tax evasion given the possibility of dishonesty among taw collectors. In 
their powerful analysis, the authors develop a model of the encounter between 
tawpayers and tax inspectors (both potentially corruptible) with the setting of a 
tax collector mechanism, and allow for the possibility of extorsion. 
 
         When the government is concerned to maximize revenue, Hendriks et 
al.(1999) demonstrate that the government cannot be better than set a 
proportional tax schedule. Focusing on the characterization of tax scheme that is 
evasion-proof, corruption-proof and revenue maximizing is undoubtedly a 
worthwhile issue. Nevertheless, the previous paper deals exclusively with direct 
taxation. In this paper, we argue that the dishonesty in taxation is also likely to 
explain differences in the structure of taxation. Indeed, the optimal tax-system 
framework can be applied to the policy-relevant choice between direct and 
indirect taxation. In particular, it is often claimed that a shift from income 
taxation to commodities taxation can combat tax –evasion (see Boadway et 
al.,1994)
2
. Here, we present an additional argument to explain the preferencefor 
indirect taxes. Commodity taxation is a suitable instrument in the combat against 
bribery between taxpayers ans tax collectors. 
 
        Using a simple three-tier hierarchy model, we stress in this paper the role of 
observability and collusion in the choice of taxation scheme. From an empirical 
perspective, we seek an information-theoretic explanation for the greater 
relaince on indirect ta xation rather than on direct taxation that one can observe 
both in developed and developing countries ( see Dudley and Montmarquette, 
1987). For our purpose, we derive a corruption-proof theorem resulting from a 
corner solution. Given the threat of collusion between taxpayers and tax 
collectors, a maximizing- revenue government sets a level of taxation that 
reduces the stake and then the benefits of collusion.The remainder of the this 
paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a model of taxation with 
potential dishonest agents.In section 3, we derive the optimal taxation structure; 
concluding comments are offered in section 4. 
 
 
    2. The Model 
        We examine taxation policy in the context of a three-tier hierarchy which 
involves a principal, an agent and a supervisor. For the presentation, we assume 
that the principal is the head of the tax collection agency, the supervisor is the 
tax collector and the agent is the taxpayer. A key assumption in our model is that 
the principal has never the supervisor’sinformation structure. 
      
      The principal is interested in controlling the agent’s activity. Hence, he want 
to get information about the agent’s level of income in order to set the optimal 
                                               
2 However, the result that changing the tax mix toward indirect taxes decreases the level of tax evasion relies on 
a strong assumption, since evasion is supposed to be possible only for the income tax. 
taxation policy. The principal hires a supervisor to monitor the action of the 
agent ans he offers a contract to the  supervisor to discipline the agent. Before 
contracting take place, the supervisor learns the agent’s level of income.The role 
of the tax collector is to make report to the principal, whose content is a 
valulable source of information. Finally, the supervisor receives a payment from 
the principal depending on the report that makes. However, th ereport may be 
untruthful when the supervisor and the agent agree to collude
3
. When collusion 
occurs , it is accompanied by a covert transfer from the agent to the supervisor ( 
see Tirole,1986); This transfer is a part of an enforceable side-contract between 
the the taw collector and the tax payer, which indicate the amount of covert 
transfer from the agent  to  the supervisor. 
     
      Let us consider a population of taxpayers, each tawpayer beung 
characterized by a revenue y . The government cannot costlessly observe the 
level of income. Nevertheless, the principal has information concerning the 
cumulative density of revenue denoted  yG  and the corresponding density 
function  yg , where Yy and Y  is defined over the support  yyY
O
, . Let   
the state of information obtained by the supervisor about the taxpayer’s 
revenue
4
. There are two cases. On the one hand, the supervisor  observes the true 
value y . The tax collector learns that the taxpayer is of type ywith probability . 
On the other hand, with a probability 1 ,  the supervisor learns nothing about 
the type of agent and the signal is defined by   ,Yy . We make the 
additional assumption that the signal   is verifiable. 
   
                                               
3 The report is expected to be untruthful only if the tax collector ans the tax payer agree on sending a falsified 
report to the principal.Thus, the agent is unable to force the supervisor to send a falsified report ans the 
supervisor can not falsify the report without the help of the agent. 
4 The role of fiscal agency is to observe the revenue  y ans to make report to the government. Investigation of a 
given tawpayer by thefiscal agency leads to a report which constitutes the signal  .  
        Now, let r be the report made by the supervisor to the principal. The tax 
collector’s report to the principal is denoted by r such that    ,Yyr . The 
tax collector can only report r  when he learns nothing about the type of 
agent, while he can either tell truth yr  or send a falsified report r  
otherwise. So, the knowledge of the type of agent Yy can give rise to a rent 
for the supervisor. When the tax collector’s search for information is fruitful, the 
supervsior is in a position to manipulate the quality of information sent to the 
principal. Thus, it becomes clear that the supervisor is expected to have a 
strategic role in the implementation of the tax policy decided by the government. 
 
       When the tax collector observes the level of income of the taxpayer 
( y ), the agent is induced to collude with the supervisor. In exchange of the 
dissimulation of the true parameter Yy , the agent offers a side contract to the 
supervisor. Hence, the agent decides to bribe the tax collector to prevent him 
from revealing the level of income Yy .To suppress reporting, the side 
contract includes an amount of covert transfer  yb  from the agent to the 
supervisor as function of the type Yy .The aim of bribery is to preserve the 
rent value for the agent which is involved by the asymmetric nature of 
information between parties. When y , it is in the interest of the supervisor 
to accept a bribe from the tawpayer, so that the signal does not translate into a 
true report to the government. 
 
        In order to get closer form solutions, we assume without loss of generality 
that the preferences of the fiscal agency are linear. Then, the utility function of 
th esupervisor is given by :   wwV  , where w  is the fiscal agency’s level of 
revenue or salary. Besides, we denote by 
o
w the reservation level of the utility 
for the agency.In the following taxation game, the amount of agency’s revenue 
wdepends on the report made by the supervisor. For the notation this means that   
 rww  with   ,Yyr . We have   ww
o
. 
 
   We are in position to write the objective function of the principal, which is 
assumed to be the expected net fiscal revenue. The fiscal revenue for the 
governement, which is denoted by  R , may be expressed as : 
 
                  Y o ydGywyywyR  111            (1) 
 
where  y  is the tax rate for an agent of type  Yy , and   may be seen as the  
cost of public funds ( see Laffont and Tirole 1993). When the supervisor reports 
the true level of income, his wage  yw  is greater than the reservation wage 
o
w  
with falsifiable report. 
 
    Bribey of the supervisor by a taxpayer is introduced in the following manner. 
Let us suppose that :  Yy 5. The taxpayer proposes a lateral contract 
specifying a transfer  yb to the supervisor. The division of the rent involved by 
asymmetric information in the hierarchy must be such that: 
 
                                            yyb
c
 1                                             (2) 
where the parameter 
C
 indicates the cost of engaging in bribery ( Laffont and 
Tirole 1993). Hence, avoiding collusion between the taxpayer and the supervisor 
in the case of an informative signal implies that the compensation  yw made by 
to the supervisor by the government must satisfy the following non collusion 
constraint: 
                                            
 
c
y
yw





1
                                                (3) 
                                               
5 This corresponds to situation where the taxpayer is successfully audited by the supervisor. 
Since 0 , the previous constraint becomes binding for the threshold value: 
                                              
 
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1
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    The key feature here is that  yw  is a function of   . Indeed, collusive 
behavior occurs when the agency may be tempted to report r  while the 
observed signal is Yy . Our purpose in this setting is to examine how the 
informational asymmtery between the supervisor ans the principal may 
influence the optimal level of taxation. 
 
 
 3. Corruption  an Optimal Policy  
 In collusion and corruption regime, there are a variety of situations where 
the tax collection agency may suffer a loss in net revenue as the outcome of 
intensified tax effort.Thus, faced with possible collusion betwee taxpayers 
ans supervisors, we study the optimal reaction in terms of taxation decision 
for the tax agency. 
 
      Anticipating the potential occurrence of corruption between the two 
lower ranks of the hierarchy, i.e. the supervisor and the agent, the 
government seeks to put in place a mechanism which induces the tax 
collector to truthfully reveal the information collected on taxpayers. Since, 
the principal’s concern is to maximize expected revenue, he solve the 
following program: 
 
 
Max

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where   is the tax rate when the report from the supervisor to the principal 
is r . The question of interest here is to determine the optimal taxation 
response for the principal to prevent collusion between the taxpayer ans the 
tax collector. Since teh objective function in equation (5) is linear in the 
decision variable , we have the following result. 
 
Proposition 1 
There exists a probability  1,0
o
  such that the corruption-proof structure 
of taxation is given by : 
             1*          if     
o
   
              1,0*     if       
o
   
             0*          if     
o
                                                                       .  
 
Proof: 
The first order condition for an interior solution  is : 
 
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Y
yydGyE  is the average income. Let  1,0
o
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Hence, the optimal value of     i s   1*       if     
o
   since 
 
0
d
dR
,    1,0*   if       
o
  since 
 
0
d
dR
 and   0*     if    
o
     since  
 
0
d
dR
                    . (Q.E.D) 
 
        
          Let us interpret this result of corruption-proof taxation. According to 
the previous proposition, the threat of collusion between taxpayer and 
supervisor leads the government to set a different scheme of taxation, with a 
shift from income taxation to commodity taxation. Indeed, a government 
which decides to use value added taxation reduce the occureence of bribery. 
The tax rates are lessened for the taxpayers characterized by an important 
probability of being dishonest
6
.Hence, indirect taxation allows the 
government to curb corruption. Conversely, when occurrence of side 
transfers is low (
o
  ) , there is no need to alleviate the optimal tax rate 
and a scheme of direct taxation is efficient. 
 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we prove insights about the role of taxation scheme policies 
aiming to combat bureaucratic corruption. We study the optimal level of 
taxation that must be implemented by a government when there exists 
potential corruption between taxpayers and auditors. Using a model of three-
layer hierarchy with asymmetric information between the supervisors, we 
show that the level of taxation should be set to zero when bribery is likely to 
                                               
6 When 
o
  ,this corresponds to a situation where occurrence of bribery between taxpayer and tax 
collectors is likely.u 
occur. Hence, by changing the tax mix toward indirect taxes, the principal 
can significantly affect the magnitude of collusive behaviors between 
taxpayer’s ans tax collectors. For the sake of simplicity, our analysis relies on 
basic assumptions. Of course, other objectives may be taken into account by 
the governement (dealing with considerations of redistribution), but this does 
not the conclusion that indirect taxation is a suitable tool in the combat 
against bribery. 
 
 As a consequence, our analysis explains why it is desirable for a revenue-
maximizing government to use indirect taxes rather than direct taxation. 
From an empirical viewpoint, one usually observes that the level of direct 
taxation remains low in poor developing countries, where collusive behaviors 
between taxpayers and tax collectors are more likely. Our framework proves 
that the greater reliance on commodity taxes than on in come taxes may be 
interpreted as the optimal decision for a government to reduce occurrence of 
collusive behaviors . While we have focused here on taxation decisions, there 
exists other organizational measures to combat collusion.In particular, 
instruments aimed at stopping excessive friendship between potential bribers 
ans public officials are expected to have a bribery-reducing impact.Examples 
are the use of extenal auditors or mechanisms of rotation among supervisory 
personnel. The tax mix is also an affective device to limit the magnitude of 
collusion, but it would be intersting to compare the effectiveness is these 
various measures in the observing combat againsit bribery. 
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